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Abstract 
Within FLYSAFE, a European Commission funded project running from 2005 to 2009, a ground based thunderstorm weather 
information and management system has been developed which uses remote sensing information from radar, satellite and 
lightning detection systems. It has successfully been employed and demonstrated during flight trials carried out in summer 2009 
over Central Europe. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the information provided by such a system could help pilots in 
gaining a better overview of the weather situation as compared to what can be provided by nowadays onboard systems. This in 
turn could help pilots in decision making, e.g. which route to take when passing through a thunderstorm line. For the study a 
number of aircraft accidents and incidents related to thunderstorm activity has been selected for demonstrating the usefulness 
of such a ground based weather information system. In each case, thunderstorm positions as detected by the ground based 
system are compared with actual aircraft positions and tracks where known. Finally, the possible up-link of the ground-based 
weather information to the cockpit is addressed by referring to ongoing and future activities in this direction. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Today’s weather information for pilots on 
thunderstorm conditions on their flight is insufficient. 
Weather charts provided by the World Area 
Forecasting Centres and taken onboard by pilots 
before take-off are based on forecasts of large scale 
weather models which are initialized only four times a 
day. These models have high predictive skill in 
forecasting the large scale weather situation, i.e., the 
distribution of high and low pressure areas together 
with synoptic scale fronts for the next days and 
precipitation for about one day in advance. 
Thunderstorms however, whose time and space 
scales typically range from tens of minutes up to an 
hour and from hundreds of meters to some kilometres 
in diameter, cannot be deterministically forecast by 
these models. On the one hand the model’s grid 
resolution is insufficient to resolve these weather 
features hence these features can only be treated in 
parameterized form. On the other hand predicting 
thunderstorms would require predicting the genesis of 
thunderstorms in the first place, which is difficult as it 
depends on a subtle interplay of various factors, 
among which are low level moisture supply; a 
conditionally unstable air mass and a forcing 
mechanism which provides the necessary lift of 
buoyant air parcels.  Furthermore, the fine detail of 
these necessary ingredients are not measured by the 
routine observational network with the effect that 
such observations are not available in the initial data 
of the model forecasts. 
These factors taken together implies that the 
information given in the weather charts with respect 
to thunderstorm occurrence cannot be accurate, 
rather such information provides only a broadscale 
picture of the spatial extent over a period of time and 
does not express the situation in terms of the 
granularity, intensity and duration. 
For the instantaneous picture in flight, pilots have 
information on thunderstorm activity through onboard 
radar equipment.  The radar provides a good 
indication on thunderstorm activity within the close 
range ahead of the aircraft, about 50 miles or so, 
provided there is precipitation within the convective 
up-droughts, strong enough to give radar returns.  
However, when precipitation cells are large and 
intense, or several cells lie behind one another, the 
radar pulses are strongly attenuated.  In such cases 
information about the situation is incomplete which 
makes it difficult for pilots to choose a proper path 
around thunderstorm cells or through a thunderstorm 
line. In addition there are cases where thunderstorm 
cells are just about to develop with weak or no 
returns on the radar, yet they can produce convective 
turbulence which can propagate to levels above the 
developing cells (Lane et al., 2003). In that case the 
aircraft might experience sudden turbulence without 
any forewarning.  
In contrast to onboard radar, remote sensing by 
ground based radar, satellite and lightning detectors 
can provide a more complete picture of the 
thunderstorm situation. Ground based systems have 
been developed which use this data to inspect cells 
from above, below and multiple viewing angles 
thereby being able to provide a more complete 
picture of the thunderstorm situation (e.g. Mueller et 
al, 2003). Thunderstorms can be detected from 
satellite observations due to their cold cloud tops and 
characteristic cloud properties; the precipitation they 
produce can be detected by radar and lightning 
discharges by lightning detectors. For the middle 
European area data retrieved by the Meteosat 
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Second Generation satellites operated by 
EUMETSAT, radar data from the European radar 
network organized by the national weather services 
and lightning data from networks operated by 
EUCLID and LINET (Betz et al., 2004)  can be used 
in expert systems to deduce and nowcast hazards 
brought about by thunderstorms. Utilising these 
sources of data a thunderstorm weather information 
and management system - Cb WIMS (Tafferner et al., 
2008; details in section 3.1) was set up within the 
course of the FLYSAFE project, which was part 
funded by the European Commission (EU-FLYSAFE, 
2005).  
FLYSAFE aimed at defining and testing new tools 
and systems contributing to the safety of flights for all 
aircraft. It focused on the development of new on-
board systems and ground-based systems to feed 
them with the information that they require. The 
project was structured upon the three “threats” which 
play a major role in aircraft accidents: collision with 
other aircraft, collision with terrain and adverse 
atmospheric conditions. For the latter, specialised 
ground based weather information management 
systems (WIMS) have been developed for the 
weather hazards icing, clear air turbulence, wake 
vortex turbulence and thunderstorms. These systems 
provided met data, in the form of feature objects, on 
the individual weather hazards over a defined area 
ranging from high resolution short-range on a local 
scale to long-range forecasts on a global scale. A 
summary on FLYSAFE achievements as regards to 
the use of weather objects for aviation activities is 
given in Mirza (2009b), as regards to weather data 
fusion in the cockpit see Verbeek et al. (2009). 
In this paper four cases of aircraft incidents with 
severe turbulence and hail encounter and one 
accident are investigated with the new tools. The aim 
is to demonstrate the improved situation awareness 
pilots would gain once the thunderstorm analyses 
and forecasts of the ground based systems are 
uplinked to the cockpit during flight.  
                 
Figure 1: Nose and wind shield damage of two aircraft hit by hail stones during passage of thunderstorms. Left: Easy Jet 
Boeing 737 after take-off from Geneva, 15 August 2003. Right: WindJet A319 near Catania on Oct 1st 2009 (The Aviation 
Herald, Photo: ATRDRIVER) 
 
2.    THUNDERSTORM HAZARDS FOR 
AIRCRFAFT  
Thunderstorms are complex weather features. 
They appear in all shapes and sizes and their 
lifetime can last from 15 minutes to several hours. 
Aircraft flying through thunderstorms are exposed to 
a number of hazards: turbulence, icing, hail, heavy 
rain, wind shear, lightning and reduced visibility. 
These hazards can act in combination and their 
strength is dependent on the type and intensity of a 
particular thunderstorm, the height at which the 
aircraft is passing through it, the duration of 
exposure, the type of aircraft and the flight phase. 
Figure 1 shows two examples where aircraft have 
been hit by hail when passing through a 
thunderstorm. In both cases the aircraft’s nose has 
been heavily damaged, and in one case also the 
wind shield has been cracked.  
Aircraft can be hit by lightning but can also 
trigger lightning; normally with no damage to the 
airframe as the interior of the plane acts like a 
Faraday cage so long as its frame is made of metal. 
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However, lightning strikes cause electronic 
equipment to malfunction which might affect safety. 
Figure 2 shows a lightning stroke which was 
probably triggered by the aircraft itself after take off 
from a Japanese Air Force Base as described in 
Uman and  Rakov (2003).  
 
 
Figure 2: Aircraft hit by lighting. Photograph found on the 
internet. Reprinted and discussed by Uman and Rakov 
(2003).  
 
Wind shear can be a great hazard for an aircraft 
especially on approach to land when passing 
through the up- and downdraft regions of a 
thunderstorm. Figure 3 illustrates the situation. First 
the aircraft experiences a lift increase when it 
encounters the outflow boundary of the 
thunderstorm; thereafter it enters the downdraft 
region where it encounters a downward force which 
is of course dangerous on approach to landing.  
 
Figure 3: Lift increase and decrease for an aircraft which 
passes through a thunderstorm at low levels (FLYSAFE) 
Thunderstorms can create an environment with 
great potential for icing which can pose a severe 
threat, depending on which parts of the aircraft are 
affected.  For example, figure 4 shows the DLR 
hosted Dornier 228 after a flight in icing conditions.  
Icing is on the windshield and on the underside of 
the wing, i.e. those parts which are not protected by 
heating or boots for this type of the aircraft. 
The high vertical velocities within the updraft 
part of the thunderstorm rapidly transport liquid 
water up to high altitudes, where atmospheric 
temperatures drop below freezing level creating 
conditions for super-cooled liquid water to exist 
even down to temperatures as low as  -40° C (Hauf 
et al, 2003). During the EURICE measurement 
campaign (Amendola et al., 1998) super-cooled 
liquid drops up to a size of 8 mm have been found 
with a research aircraft (Sanchez et al., 1998). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: wind shield and wing icing after a flight of the 
DLR Dornier 228 aircraft in severe icing conditions. 
 
There have been numerous incidents and also a 
few accidents due to aircraft icing, e.g the ATR-72 
crash near Chicago 1994 (Sand and Biter, 2000).   
Icing of the Pitot tubes can result in wrong speed 
indications for the pilots or the onboard computer. In 
two cases of unintended descent within the upper 
parts of two independent thunderstorms a complete 
freezing of the Pitot tubes was observed even 
though the anti-ice (heating) systems were 
activated (Hauf et al., 1999). Figure 5 shows icing 
accretion on the Pitot tubes of the DLR Dornier 228 
after landing.  
Turbulence in thunderstorms can force changes 
in vertical velocity of about +50 m/s to -25 m/s on 
short distances, which can impart corresponding 
changes in vertical accelerations to the aircraft  
which in turn can lead to injuries of flight personnel 
if not securely fastened to their seats. 
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Figure 5: Icing of Pitot tubes, picture taken after landing of 
a flight of the DLR Dornier 228 aircraft in severe icing 
conditions. 
 
In extreme cases the forces can surmount the 
structural limits of the airframe (e.g. NLM Fokker F-
28, Cityhopper crash, 6.10.81, Moerdijk NL).  
 
Heavy rain in thunderstorms can in extreme 
cases cause flame out of the engines (e.g. May 24, 
1988, a Salvadoran Boeing 737 arriving from Belize 
picking its way among thunderstorms ringing New 
Orleans). Another threat heavy rain can cause is 
skidding and eventually overshooting the runway 
during landing (e.g. Kingston, Jamaica Dec 23, 
2009, a Boeing 737-800).  
 
3.    GROUND AND SATELLITE BASED 
OBSERVING SYSTEMS  
 
3.1 CB WIMS - Thunderstorm weather 
information and management system 
As mentioned above (section 1) various tools 
and systems have been developed within the 
research community to detect and nowcast 
thunderstorms. As part of the FLYSAFE project, a 
weather-information and management system was 
set-up for thunder-storms (CB-WIMS).  DLR led the 
team and co-ordinated the contributions from Météo 
France, the UK Met Office, ONERA, the University 
of Hanover and DLR. 
A set of requirements of pilots were obtained 
from a questionnaire and from discussions held at 
meetings, Pilots had expressed clearly that they do 
not wish to be confronted with a picture of the full 
complexity of a particular thunderstorm, which they 
would have to interpret themselves with regard to 
their flight, rather they would have the weather 
experts to define hazardous regions and tell the 
pilots where they can or where they cannot go.  To 
fulfil this requirement the thunderstorm forecasts 
output from CB-WIMS are reexpressed as weather 
object, which define hazard volumes representing 
thunderstorm threats for aircraft.  The aim of the 
weather object is  to reduce then complexity of the 
weather feature. Figure 6 illustrates the concept.  
In Figure 6, hazard volumes are depicted as 
cylinders for simplicity, however, in practice 
polygons are used.  A thunderstorm object is 
composed of a “top volume” and a “bottom volume.”  
The nested bottom objects define volumes where 
the thunderstorm hazards of wind shear, 
turbulence, heavy rain, hail, icing and lightning can 
occur within the lower tropospheric part of a 
thunderstorm cell which present a hazard to aircraft 
flying at low levels, especially during landing and 
take-off.  
The bottom volumes are constructed by use of 
3D-radar and lighting data using Météo-France’ 
CONO algorithm (Hering et al., 2005) with severity 
defined by radar reflectivity thresholds 33 and 41 
dBZ. The volume of each cylinder, in this case, 
represent the severity levels “moderate” and 
“severe” respectively. 
The top volumes represent the hazards: 
turbulence, icing, and lightning and are detected 
from satellite data using DLR’s Cb-TRAM algorithm 
(Zinner et al., 2008). Here the “severe” threshold is 
selected based on lightning density, an additional 
data source from the LINET network (Betz et al., 
2004). A detailed description of the thunderstorms 
objects and their attributes is found in Tafferner et 
al. (2008). 
 
Figure 6: Bottom and top volumes representing hazard 
volumes for aircraft in two severity levels. 
3.2 Results from research flights carried out 
during  FLYSAFE 
Evaluation from research flights  carried out 
during FLYSAFE (Senesi et al., 2009) 
demonstrated that nowcast objects from CB WIMS 
could provide additional and valuable information on 
thunderstorm activity to the pilots. As part of the off-
line evaluation contours of Nowcast weather objects 
were overlaid on the radar display, which was 
recorded to video during research flights. This 
evaluation found that:  
 Thunderstorms can be represented by 
relatively simple bottom and top volumes in a 
meaningful way for aviation users (pilots and 
controllers) 
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 WIMS CB data are especially useful at the 
strategic time scale, namely beyond 10 minutes 
and in combination with Strategic Data 
Consolidation and Conflict Detection & Solution 
functions on-board an aircraft 
 There is a real potential of the WIMS CB 
concept for safety in aviation since:  
o it surveys a much larger area than a single 
radar on-board the aircraft 
o it fuses data from lightning, satellite (multiple 
channels), polarimetric C and S band radar 
and atmospheric analyses from ground with 
on-board information  
o it provides a more "complete" picture of the 
hazard 
 
As an example, we reprint here, figure 7, a 
snapshot of the radar display recorded during an 
experimental flight (figure 14 of Sénési et al. ,2009).   
The CB Weather objects  from the WMS are shown 
as  outlines in figure 7. CB bottom objects are pink 
and yellow representing severe and moderate 
hazards.   CB Tops are orange and represent a 
moderate hazard.   The spatial distribution of the 
CB weather objects agree well with the close range 
radar depiction to the forward right of the aircraft 
position (near the 50 nm range circle). However, 
beyond the close range, Cb weather objects 
indicate additional thunderstorm activity and also 
another cell further away (beyond the 100 nm range 
circle). Both these Cb cells are later confirmed after 
10 and 20 minutes respectively by the onboard 
radar as the flight continues. Note that the radar 
returns on the left side beyond 50 nm are due to 
ground clutter and therefore not confirmed by CB 
WIMS as thunderstorm activity.   
 
 
Figure 7: On board radar image for 14h05 UT on 19th 
August 2008. WIMS CB objects for 14h05 shown in yellow 
and pink for bottom objects moderate and severe plus 
orange contours showing CB top objects. 
 
For the incidents and accidents reported upon in 
the next section we do not have onboard radar data 
available, nevertheless it will be demonstrated that 
thunderstorm information from the ground and 
satellite based observing systems provided to the 
pilots would most probably have helped raise their 
situation awareness with respect to the weather 
hazards they may encounter.     
4. WEATHER RELATED AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS 
AS SEEN FROM GROUND AND SATELLITE 
BASED OBSERVING SYSTEMS 
4.1 European (continental) cases 
a) Incident of 9 May 2009: a quickly developing 
cell on the right flank of a major system 
On 9 May 2009 a thunderstorm system originated in 
northern Switzerland and moved north-eastward 
over Lake Constance.  At 1755 UT it is located 
north of the lake and partly over the river Danube 
(Fig. 8a). The red contour marks the upper level 
thunderstorm “top object” as determined from 
Meteosat satellite data by the DLR cloud tracker 
Cb-TAM (Zinner et al., 2009). The top object 
encircles the strongest updraft region. The figure 
sequence exhibits the rapid development of a new 
thunderstorm cell on the right flank of the mature 
cell, detected as convective initiation on 1800 UT 
(yellow contour in Fig. 8b) and rapid development at 
1805 UT (orange contour in Fig. 8c). During the 
initiation phase an Airbus A321 enroute from 
Munich to Lisbon hit the related convective updraft. 
Severe turbulence was reported by the pilots, as a 
result two flight attendants and thirteen passengers 
were injured. The flight data recorder shows at 1753 
UT a vertical acceleration of +1,85 g immediately 
followed by -0.5 g (BFU, 2009).  The ground based 
radar observation from the European composite 
(Hafner, DWD) shows reflectivity values below 37 
dBZ in the region of the yellow contour at 1800 UT 
and outside the thunderstorm bottom objects (figure 
9). The latter are determined by DLR’s radar tracker 
Rad-TRAM (Kober and Tafferner, 2009).  The radar 
image is composed of measurements from different 
radars such that at any point in space the reflectivity 
value is that of the lowest value within the set of 
scans and therefore is not representative of the 
convective precipitation processes in the whole 
vertical column. Indeed, inspecting the cross 
section along the flight track constructed from the 
full 3-dimensional radar scan from the Türkheim 
radar (48.06° N, 10.64° E), we find a small but 
intense reflectivity cell between about 5 and 7 km 
height reaching 30 dBZ just underneath the flight 
track at around 1750 UTC (Fig. 10). The flight track 
in the figure is marked by pink line segments. Note 
that the time stamp of the radar image in figure 10, 
1746 UT, is the start time of the radar scan and it 
takes a few minutes to scan the full volume. It is 
probable that these observations correspond to the 
convective cell which produced the turbulence at 
the height of the flight track, at about 9 km, when 
the aircraft passed over it.  As reported by the pilots 
there were indications of precipitation but without 
echoes on the radar display. This can be explained 
in the following way.  
During that particular flight phase when the 
aircraft approached the thunderstorm region from 
the east, the aircraft was ascending (refer to the 
pink line in Fig. 10). Provided the radar only 
performed a horizontal scan without tilting, it 
probably did not detect the small cell because it was 
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Figure 8: Thunderstorm cell development from 1755 (a) 
over 1800 (b) to 1805 UT (c). Marked in red: Cb top, 
yellow: convection initiation, orange: rapid development; 
blue: lightning observations during past 5 minutes (from 
LINET, Betz et al., 2004). Infrared satellite image in grey 
transparent  shading. Flight track starting from Munich 
marked by dotted line, also a/c position at 1753 UT. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Same situation as in Fig. 8 at 1800 UT, but with 
radar reflectivity instead of satellite image and with violet 
contour marking the Cb bottom objects (by use of a 37 
dBZ reflectivity threshold) in addition to the top object.  
 
M
 
Figure 10: Vertical section through the radar reflectivity 
field as gained from the Türkheim radar at about 1748 UT 
along the flight path (pink line). Aircraft positions marked 
for 1751 and 1757 UTC. 
 
below the lowest scan line of the radar. It is also 
possible that the gain switch was set at a too high 
value because of the strong thunderstorm cell to the 
north which the pilots wanted to avoid, again with 
the consequence that the small cell beneath did not 
show up on the screen. Finally, whilst flying over the 
cell, there were indications of precipitation to the 
pilots (perhaps on the wind shield). In accord with 
this note the vertical cross-section of the reflectivity 
pattern which indicates precipitation particles 
intersecting with the aircraft track (Fig. 10).  At 
about the same time, the convective initiation is 
noticeable by lighting detections in that region (Fig. 
8b). Note that these figures present lightning obser-
vations during the past 5 minutes before 1800 UTC.   
 
In conclusion, this analysis shows that it was 
certainly difficult for the pilots to receive a clear 
early warning from their onboard equipment. In the 
BFU report it is also noted that the pilots decided to 
make a change in track by 5° to the south, possibly 
in order to avoid the mature thunderstorm system to 
the north (which they saw using the onboard radar). 
However, it has to be stated that even the use 
of the ground and satellite based systems it would 
have been difficult to issue a timely warning in this 
case due to the rapid development of the 
convective cell. It is not uncommon that cold air 
outflows from mature thunderstorms provide 
convergence and the necessary lift for triggering 
new cells ahead of the existing systems. For 
detecting these mesoscale processes a 
combination of all available remote sensing data 
together with wind observations and numerical 
model forecast data is necessary within an 
integrated system with the aim to enable timely 
warnings. What can be done in the case of 
observable thunderstorms has been demonstrated 
in the course of the FLYSAFE project (Tafferner et 
al., 2009).  Research is also underway to make it 
possible to nowcast convective initiation, i.e. to 
correctly predict time and location where a 
thunderstorm will develop. This is a still difficult task 
however, especially when considering not only the 
time needed to collect and process the data, which 
can be reduced to some minutes, but also the time 
needed to bring the information to the cockpit. 
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b) Incident of 5 June 2008 
On 5 June 2008, an Airbus A319 aircraft during 
the descent to Munich experienced turbulence 
about 3 nm north of the way point LANDU at flight 
level 110 at 1637 UTC (BFU 2008). The 
approximate position is indicated in figure 11 by the 
dotted white oval.  
 
 
Figure 11: Radar reflectivity and Cb bottom volumes (pink 
contours) over southern Germany at time 1645; MSG 
rapid scan HRV image (transparent grey) and Cb top 
volume (red) at time 1640; approximate aircraft position 
indicated when turbulence encountered at 1637 UT.  The 
black diamond marks the position of Munich airport. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Radar reflectivity at four different times on 5 
June 2008 from DLR polarimetric radar at a height of 
3100m AMSL. The little dot at the crossing of the river Isar 
and the 80 km range circle marks the way point LANDU.  
 
According to the BFU report, the pilots saw two 
cumulus clouds left and right of the flight path which 
were also apparent on the navigation display. In the 
figure, these are obviously the two cells marked by 
coloured contours on both sides of the aircraft 
position.  
Like in the previous case, the intensity values in 
the radar composite are below 37 dBZ in the region 
of the aircraft. However, a detailed inspection of 
radar data from the DLR operated polarimetric radar 
POLDIRAD in the form of a constant altitude plan 
position indicator (CAPPI) at 3.1 km, somewhat 
below the height where the descending aircraft was 
at that time, shows the growth of small cells of high 
reflectivity up to 40 dBZ just north of waypoint 
LANDU between 1631 and 1642 UTC (figure 12). It 
is plausible that the aircraft approaching from north 
hit one of these cells with the turbulence encounter.  
Again, as in the previous case, forecasting 
these events of convective activity is a very 
demanding task.  
Approximate position of a/c when 
Turbulence encountered  
c) Encounter of severe turbulence and hail near 
Catania on Oct 1st 2009: 
By the time of this writing it is not quite clear 
where and when then incident exactly happened. In 
a report from the website of The Aviation Herald 
(The Aviation Herald, 1) dated 13 October 2009 
which refers to Italy's "Agenzia Nazionale per la 
Sicurezza del Volo" (ANSV) the following 
description of an  incident was given.  
“The crew of a Windjet Airbus A319-100, 
registration EI-ECX performing flight IV-283 from 
Forli to Palermo (Italy), decided to divert to Catania 
90 nm southeast of Palermo due to adverse 
weather conditions in Palermo. During the approach 
to Catania the airplane encountered severe 
turbulence and hail. The crew continued for a safe 
landing in Catania. No injuries occurred.”  
A photograph taken after landing (figure 1, right) 
shows a hole in the aircraft’s radome due to hail 
encounter. Also it is noted in the Aviation Herald 
page by referring to a report from a mechanics after 
landing that “the airplane experienced wind shear of 
+50/-50 knots on final approach to Palermo 
prompting the crew to initiate a go-around. The 
airplane did not climb until after passing the runway 
at very low height despite the engines at full thrust”.  
On the internet (Aviation Safety Network, 2009) 
the report of a passenger is published, who states 
among other things: “From the sound and the 
frequency of impact of the ice lumps, the hailstones 
must have been at least 10cm in diameter. The hail 
shower lasted for about one minute. After landing at 
Catania one could see the destroyed radome (see 
photo. Fig 1), dents on the forward edges of wings 
and tail, and an opening in the vertical rudder 
surface.”  The time of the incident is given as “about 
17:00”. 
The METAR from Palermo, available around the 
time of the incident, reports at 1450 UT a 20° Wind 
with 26 knots with lowest visibility of 4000m, 
thunderstorm as present weather. The Cb-TRAM 
analysis for about this time is shown in figure 13. 
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Figure 13: High resolution visible satellite image in grey 
transparent shading and mature thunderstorm cells at 
1455 UT marked by thick red contours, thin red contours 
indicate one hour nowcasts of the cells. Lightning 
observations recorded during past 5 minutes before 1455 
UT marked by pink dots (from LINET observation system). 
Dotted line segments mark direction from Forli to Palermo 
and from Palermo to Catania.  
 
The satellite image from Meteosat in the high 
reso-lution visible channel shows an approaching 
thunder-storm front towards the island of Sicily. The 
heavy convection cells, marked in red, and the 
lightning activity in the frontral line, observations 
from the LINET network, can be traced back for 
more than three hours before this time. Most 
probably the aircraft flew into the foremost 
convective cell (labelled with 410) just off the coast 
of Palermo, where the black arrow indicates its 
progression. Note also that the one hour nowcast of 
that cell indicates propagation to the east. There are 
also lightning observations in that cell.  
This is clearly an event where the satellite 
based analysis and nowcast could have been used 
to issue a thunderstorm warning for the region of 
Palermo at least half an hour before the aircraft 
entered the dangerous region. This information 
brought to the cockpit in time would have indicated 
the approaching hazard to the pilot long before he 
can notice it on the radar display which again would 
help in strategic planning.  
 
4.2 Oceanic cases 
a) Accident  of 1 June 2009 
On Sunday 31 May 2009 at 22 h 29 UTC (19 h 
29 Rio time), the Airbus A330-203 registered F-
GZCP, operated by Air France under flight number 
AF447, took off from Rio de Janeiro Galeão airport 
bound for Paris Charles de Gaulle. The airplane 
was carrying 216 passengers of 32 nationalities as 
well as 12 crew members. Around 3 h 45 minutes 
after take-off, the airplane crashed into the Atlantic 
Ocean about 435 nautical miles north-north-east of 
Fernando de Noronha Island, in the middle of the 
night and without any emergency message being 
sent. The last contact between the airplane and 
Brazilian Air Traffic Control (ATC) had been made 
around 35 minutes previously (BEA, Dec. 2009). 
Soon after the accident a detailed 
meteorological analysis was presented by Vasquez 
(2009) on the internet.  From all possible weather 
phenomena which could have threatened the 
aircraft, i.e. turbulence, lightning, icing, precipitation, 
hail and warm sink, he explained that severe 
turbulence at flight level could have played a major 
role; all other contributors were most likely of minor 
to no importance. Finally he concluded: “Overall 
what we know for sure is weather was a factor and 
the flight definitely crossed through a thunderstorm 
complex. There is a definite correlation of weather 
with the crash. However the analysis indicates that 
the weather is not anything particularly exceptional 
in terms of instability or storm structure”. Currently 
there is no definite answer to what caused the crash 
(also because the blackbox recorder has not been 
found).  However, there are speculations of whether 
icing of the Pitot tubes (related links also in 
Vasquez’ report) might have enforced wrong speed 
measurements and consequently loss of flight 
control. From experiences gained through research 
flights over Germany carried out by DLR (Hauf et., 
1999) in 1999, this cannot completely be ruled out. 
On those flights the DLR operated DORNIER 
aircraft DO-328 descended into high cumulus tops 
with concurrent icing of the Pitot tubes at an air 
temperature around -40° C, about the same 
temperature value at the height where AF447 was 
flying (according to Vasquez’ analysis). On the one 
hand this shows that aircraft icing is possible at 
temperatures as low as -40° C at least in 
continental convective clouds, but on the other hand 
it is not clear whether this is possible also in tropical 
maritime convective clouds where cloud physical 
processes are different, e.g due to different 
temperature and humidity profiles and different 
aerosol content.  
Estimated a/c path from report 
Figure 14 shows the convective situation over 
the Atlantic at two different times, i.e. 0000 and 
0130 UTC, from the satellite cloud analysis. Red 
contours mark again the convective updrafts as 
detected by Cb-TRAM. The flight track is indicated 
by a white line combining the way points INTOL and 
TASIL. The convective cloud feature which is 
traversed by the flight route is seen to grow 
remarkably during this time span of ninety minutes. 
For the time 0130 UTC when the aircraft reported 
waypoint INTOL to ATC an approximate radar 
range of 80 nm is drawn as a yellow circle around 
the aircraft. This is to demonstrate that at this time 
the pilots could not foresee the strong convective 
activity on their future track from the on-board radar 
detection (also a longer range would not change the 
situation). Also, just from looking out of the window 
it was probably impossible for them to recognize the 
thunderstorm complexes in the far distance due to 
the midnight darkness. Furthermore there are no 
lightning discharges observed from the networks for 
this region at this time (noted by Vasquez’ report) 
which could have warned the pilots. Half an hour 
later, at 0200 UTC, when the aircraft was close to 
the major convective complex (figure 15a), the 
onboard radar should have detected the cells, but 
now indicating convective activity almost 
everywhere in front of the aircraft which makes it 
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difficult for the pilot to decide whether to penetrate 
the system or to go around and in which direction. 
This is complicated by the fact that the onboard 
radar signal is strongly attenuated by precipitation, 
due to its short wave length of 3cm (as compared to 
ground based radars) with the effect not being able 
to render the real extension of the storm. In this 
case the pilots obviously chose to go through the 
convective complex. Figure 15b shows the aircraft 
in its last known position when it had almost 
crossed the major storm cell at 0210 UTC.  
 
 
 
Figure 14: Meteosat infrared image over the Atlantic east 
of Brasil together with convective clusters (red contours) 
as identified from the Cb-TRAM cloud analysis on 1 June 
2009 for time 000 UTC (a) and 0130 UTC (b). Also 
marked is the flight route between the way points INTOL 
and TASIL. The yellow circle indicates a radar range of 
about 80nm. Yellow, orange and green little patches mark 
initial developments not relevant for this analysis and not 
discussed.  
 
What can and what cannot be seen on the 
onboard radar deserves more attention, especially 
for aircraft flying through tropical convective 
complexes at high altitudes. From an investigation 
undertaken by Air France (Flightglobal, 2009) it 
looks like that the setting of the sensitivity, i.e. the 
gain switch, has a great influence on what is seen 
on the navigational display. In that report it is stated: 
"Several other flights - ahead of, and trailing, AF447 
at about the same altitude - altered course to avoid 
cloud masses. Those included another Air France 
A330 operating the AF459 service from Sao Paulo 
to Paris. That crew crossed a turbulent area that 
had not been detected on weather radar and, as a 
result, increased the sensitivity - subsequently 
avoiding a "much worse" area of turbulence.” And 
further in the report it is noted that: “France's 
Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses says the crew of 
AF459, which had been 37min behind AF447, 
detected echoes on the weather radar which 
‘differed significantly’ depending on the radar 
setting.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: as in figure 14, but for 0200 UTC (a) and 0210 
UTC (b) 
 
When searching for a physical explanation one 
could speculate that the droplet size and 
precipitation particles at the height where aircraft fly 
through these tropical storms are quite small and 
are therefore not detectable or only with weaker 
return signals by the onboard radar (Rosenfeld, 
pers. comm. with one of the co-authors).  
Regardless whether strong or weak returns can 
be seen on the navigational display by the pilot, the 
a 
0133 Z reportet INTOL 
0233Z estimated TASIL 
b 
0133 Z reportet INTOL
0233Z estimated TASIL
0200 Z
a
0210 Last ACARS 
         message 
0133 Z reportet INTOL
0200 Z
0145 Z
b
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sequence of figures 14 and 15 makes clear that the 
ground based information is able to represent the 
real situation about the convective activity and that 
this information, when brought to the cockpit, would 
help pilots in making decisions, especially when the 
planned route is impacted by thunderstorms. Ideally 
an alternative route in a given situation would be 
proposed by the ground based systems, e.g. as 
indicated by the dotted line in figure 16. This is not 
to say that the indicated route would have been 
possible for flight AF447. There might be 
restrictions due to ATC, prescribed air routes or fuel 
uptake which would not allow such a detour. 
Furthermore, it is known that often aircraft fly 
through these storms without any problems. 
Obviously, it is not only the mere presence and 
location of these storms that is relevant but also 
their evolution; whether they are growing in size or 
depth, their movement and possibly more elaborate 
attitudes like height, precipitation rate and type, 
lightning activity and turbulence level.  Some of 
which have been addressed in the FLYSAFE Cb 
WIMS. 
 
 
Figure 16: As in fig. 14b, with indication of alternative 
route marked by dotted line. 
 
b) Incident of 30 November 2009 
From Aviation Herald (Hradecky, 2009): “An Air 
France Airbus A330-200, registration F-GZCK 
performing flight AF-445 (dep Nov 29th) from Rio de 
Janeiro Galeao, RJ (Brazil) to Paris Charles de 
Gaulle (France) with 203 passengers and 12 crew, 
was enroute at FL380 overhead the Atlantic on 
airway UN866 just before waypoint DEKON about 
680nm northeast of Fortaleza,CE (Brazil) and 
750nm southwest of Praia (Cape Verde), when the 
crew called Mayday on the international emergency 
frequency indicating, they encountered severe 
turbulence and were descending to a lower 
altitude.” 
Later in the report it is noted that the airplane 
was at FL380 about 60nm ahead of DEKON on 
airway UN866 at time 0350 UTC. The Cb-TRAM 
analysis for this date and time is shown in figure 17 
together with the airway and the approximate 
position when Mayday was called. Apparently the 
aircraft flew right through a major thunderstorm as 
seen clearly in the satellite image and marked by 
the red contour. From inspection of the 
development before and after this time (not shown) 
it is apparent that the convective cluster in this 
location originated around 0100 UTC and was still 
growing at the time of encounter. Also one can 
notice that additional convective clouds are on the 
 
 
Figure 17: IR Meteosat 9 image on 30 November 2009  at 
0350 UTC with mature convective cells (red contours) 
from Cb-TRAM analysis. Airway UN866 marked by yellow 
dotted line together with position of aircraft.   
 
flight path further to the north between DEKON and 
BUXON way points (fig. 17). According to the report 
the turbulence lasted for about 30 minutes. It is not 
clear whether it would have been possible for the 
pilot to choose another route. The French Bureau 
d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA) reports that 
according to the air safety report weather forced the 
crew to divert from the airway and descend to 
FL360 employing oceanic contingency procedures 
after being unable to obtain clearance from ATC. 
  
Some questions immediately arise again as in 
the previous case: would it have been possible to fly 
safer routes to the right or left of the clusters or 
were these options difficult/not possible due to ATC 
control regulations? Since the pilots did not receive 
ATC clearance, was the area under ATC control 
not?   Would fuel considerations matter? In case 
detours are possible, then one could expect that a 
future uplink of weather data, e.g. a satellite image 
together with the Cb polygons, would be quite 
valuable to the pilots for early strategic planning. 
The weather data could be displayed e.g. on an 
electronic flight bag. 
 
 
 
 
0133 Z reportet INTOL 
0233Z estimated TASIL 
DEKON
BUXON
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5. IMPROVED WEATHER INFORMATION FOR 
PILOTS THROUGH UPLINK  
It was demonstrated through the FLYSAFE 
project that is possible to uplink weather information 
to the flight deck using industry standard internet 
technologies and current satellite data links 
(Intelsat) (Mirza et al, 2008, 2009a, Verbeck et al, 
2009).  It was also shown during flight simulations 
and scenario walkthroughs with domain experts that 
weather information presented in the form of 
weather objects on the navigation display was 
considered to be helpful, especially for strategic 
planning and raising the pilots’ situation awareness.  
We suggest that our analysis of the case studies 
presented that uplink of rich weather information 
would be especially valuable for oceanic flights, 
where surface-based observations are limited or not 
available. 
Currently incorporation of weather information 
into avionics systems is still within the domain of 
research and development, and many hurdles will 
need to be overcome before such systems are 
considered to be a part of the primary systems.  
Some the hurdles are not related to the technology 
but more related to institutional issues, such as 
certification, quality management and legal, etc.  
However, today it is noted that there is an 
increasing trend in the use of electronic flight books, 
which are preloaded with weather information; and 
for aircraft used for passenger transport, the 
availability of cabin internet services.  Thus is it is 
not beyond the realms of possibility to foresee 
weather information being uplinked via the cabin 
internet services then subsequently routed to an 
electronic flight book; thereby affording the flight 
crew a greater awareness of the weather situation 
for their route. Until primary systems are in place 
services for weather information would have to be 
regarded as advisory. 
The next two decades will witness a 
reformation of the management of the national 
airspace within the United States and Europe.  This 
reformation is being spearheaded by two research 
and development programmes – SESAR and 
NextGen (SESAR,2007, JPDO, 2006, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008).  Both programmes envisage that 
weather information will become more readily 
available to all users via the concept of the 4-D 
Weather Cube (Eurocontrol, 2006a, 2006b, UCAR 
2008).  When such a facility is in place then 
information about thunderstorms could be made 
available on request or through publish and 
subscribe services, as could all the weather 
information developed during the FLYSAFE project.  
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